@lm_fe/provoke
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Scoped internal package with approved dependents; sparse metadata is a style issue, not a malware indicator. | ai |
Versions (showing 8 of 8)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.2.12 | 3 / 2 | |
| 0.2.11 | 3 / 2 | |
| 0.2.10 | 3 / 2 | |
| 0.2.8 | 3 / 2 | |
| 0.2.7 | 3 / 2 | |
| 0.2.6 | 3 / 2 | |
| 0.2.5 | 3 / 2 | |
| 0.2.2 | 3 / 2 |
v0.2.10
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.8
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.