@loaders.gl/3d-tiles
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | encoded-string-file:dist/dist.min.js | AI (source-diff): dist/dist.min.js is a webpack UMD bundle built by the package's own build script; long encoded strings are normal minification artifacts. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established visgl monorepo package; lack of provenance is consistent across all versions. | ai |
Versions (showing 4 of 4)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 4.4.2 | 14 / 0 | |
| 4.4.1 | 14 / 0 | |
| 4.4.0 | 14 / 0 | |
| 4.3.4 | 14 / 0 |
v4.4.2
2 findingsModified file contains 3 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.4.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.4.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.3.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.