@loaders.gl/wms
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:qs | AI (typosquat): Scoped monorepo package @loaders.gl/wms; Levenshtein match to 'qs' is a false positive with no impersonation intent. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:deep-strict-equal | AI (phantom-deps): deep-strict-equal is declared in dependencies; phantom-dep heuristic misfires for this package. | ai |
v4.4.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.4.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.4.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.3.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.