@loaders.gl/zip
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | encoded-string-file:dist/dist.min.js | AI (source-diff): Standard webpack UMD minified bundle; long strings are expected build artifacts for this package. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:yup | AI (typosquat): Scoped @loaders.gl package; Levenshtein match to 'yup' is a false positive with no brand confusion. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:zod | AI (typosquat): Scoped @loaders.gl package; Levenshtein match to 'zod' is a false positive with no brand confusion. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:md5 | AI (phantom-deps): md5 is a declared dependency in package.json; phantom-dep heuristic misfires here. | ai |
v4.4.2
2 findingsModified file contains 1 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.4.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.4.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.3.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.