@lobb-js/lobb-ext-auth
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): Internal scoped package; sparse metadata is consistent across all versions. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Published via GitHub Actions CI; provenance not enabled but no malicious indicators present. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Sparse metadata reflects an early-stage private/internal package, not spam or malware. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.11.2 | 3 / 18 | |
| 0.11.0 | 3 / 18 | |
| 0.10.4 | 3 / 19 | |
| 0.1.67 | 0 / 15 | |
| 0.1.66 | 0 / 15 |
v0.11.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.11.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.10.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.67
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.66
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.