@lobu/cli
CLI for deploying and managing AI agents on Lobu
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | large-new-source-files | AI (source-diff): Major version jump adds bundled frontend and server code; expected. | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist/owletto/dist/assets/date-range-picker-WHHTUX38.js | AI (source-diff): Minified UI bundle; fetch + eval patterns from bundled libraries, not malware. | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist/owletto/dist/assets/index-D8F_RN7V.js | AI (source-diff): Minified UI bundle; fetch + eval patterns from bundled libraries, not malware. | ai | |
| source-diff | source-size-tripled | AI (source-diff): Major version jump ships bundled frontend UI and server bundle; expected growth. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/owletto/dist/assets/date-range-picker-WHHTUX38.js | AI (source-diff): Vite-bundled frontend asset (date-fns/UI components); standard minification, not obfuscation. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/owletto/dist/assets/entity-page-EWpjzZdn.js | AI (source-diff): Vite-bundled frontend asset; standard minification. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/owletto/dist/assets/index-BIK25itL.js | AI (source-diff): Vite-bundled frontend asset; standard minification. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/owletto/dist/assets/index-bsmDwtx5.js | AI (source-diff): Vite-bundled frontend asset (React runtime); standard minification. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/owletto/dist/assets/index-D8F_RN7V.js | AI (source-diff): Vite-bundled frontend asset; standard minification. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Publisher changed to GitHub Actions with SLSA attestation — legitimate CI/CD pipeline transition for this monorepo package. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): @lobu/core is a same-org sibling at matching version 3.0.19; consistent with monorepo internal refactor. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:joi | AI (typosquat): @lobu/cli is a scoped package for the Lobu AI platform, not a typosquat of joi; edit distance match is coincidental. | ai |
Versions (showing 27 of 27)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 9.1.0 | 68 / 3 | |
| 5.0.0 | 11 / 2 | |
| 4.3.0 | 11 / 2 | |
| 4.2.0 | 11 / 3 | |
| 4.1.0 | 11 / 3 | |
| 4.0.1 | 11 / 3 | |
| 3.5.0 | 11 / 3 | |
| 3.4.3 | 11 / 3 | |
| 3.4.2 | 11 / 3 | |
| 3.4.1 | 11 / 3 | |
| 3.4.0 | 11 / 3 | |
| 3.3.0 | 11 / 3 | |
| 3.2.0 | 11 / 3 | |
| 3.1.1 | 11 / 3 | |
| 3.1.0 | 11 / 3 | |
| 3.0.19 | 11 / 3 | |
| 3.0.16 | 10 / 3 | |
| 3.0.12 | 10 / 3 | |
| 3.0.8 | 10 / 3 | |
| 3.0.7 | 9 / 3 | |
| 3.0.6 | 9 / 3 | |
| 3.0.5 | 9 / 3 | |
| 3.0.4 | 10 / 3 | |
| 3.0.3 | 8 / 3 | |
| 3.0.2 | 8 / 3 | |
| 3.0.1 | 8 / 3 | |
| 3.0.0 | 8 / 3 |
v9.1.0
8 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.3.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-25. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.1.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-21. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.5.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.4.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.4.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.4.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.4.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.3.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-14. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.2.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.19
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.12
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.8
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.0.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.