@lobu/core
Core types and utilities for Lobu agent platform
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions publisher with SLSA attestation is a legitimate CI/CD migration, not a compromise signal. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): zod is a widely-trusted validation library; addition is benign for this package's use case. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:etc-passwd-access | AI (semgrep): Fires inside a sanitizeFilename test asserting /etc/passwd path traversal is stripped — not credential access. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:base64-decode | AI (semgrep): Used in encryption key parsing utility; legitimate cryptographic key handling pattern. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:hex-decode | AI (semgrep): Used in encryption key parsing utility; legitimate cryptographic key handling pattern. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:cors | AI (typosquat): Scoped package @lobu/core is a legitimate platform library; Levenshtein match to 'cors' is coincidental. | ai |
Versions (showing 46 of 46)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 11.0.0 | 8 / 3 | |
| 10.2.0 | 8 / 3 | |
| 10.1.0 | 8 / 3 | |
| 10.0.0 | 8 / 3 | |
| 9.4.1 | 8 / 3 | |
| 9.4.0 | 8 / 3 | |
| 9.3.0 | 8 / 3 | |
| 9.2.0 | 8 / 3 | |
| 9.1.1 | 8 / 3 | |
| 9.1.0 | 8 / 3 | |
| 9.0.0 | 8 / 3 | |
| 8.0.0 | 8 / 3 | |
| 7.2.0 | 8 / 3 | |
| 7.1.0 | 8 / 3 | |
| 7.0.0 | 8 / 3 | |
| 6.1.1 | 8 / 3 | |
| 6.1.0 | 8 / 3 | |
| 6.0.1 | 8 / 3 | |
| 6.0.0 | 8 / 3 | |
| 5.0.0 | 9 / 3 | |
| 4.3.0 | 9 / 3 | |
| 4.2.0 | 9 / 3 | |
| 4.1.0 | 9 / 3 | |
| 4.0.1 | 9 / 3 | |
| 4.0.0 | 9 / 3 | |
| 3.7.0 | 9 / 3 | |
| 3.5.0 | 9 / 3 | |
| 3.4.3 | 9 / 3 | |
| 3.4.2 | 9 / 3 | |
| 3.4.1 | 9 / 3 | |
| 3.4.0 | 9 / 3 | |
| 3.3.0 | 9 / 3 | |
| 3.2.0 | 9 / 3 | |
| 3.1.1 | 9 / 3 | |
| 3.1.0 | 9 / 3 | |
| 3.0.19 | 9 / 3 | |
| 3.0.16 | 8 / 3 | |
| 3.0.13 | 8 / 3 | |
| 3.0.12 | 8 / 3 | |
| 3.0.10 | 8 / 3 | |
| 3.0.9 | 8 / 3 | |
| 3.0.8 | 8 / 3 | |
| 3.0.7 | 8 / 3 | |
| 3.0.6 | 8 / 3 | |
| 3.0.5 | 8 / 3 | |
| 2.8.0 | 8 / 3 |
v11.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v10.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v10.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v10.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v9.4.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v9.4.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v9.3.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v9.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v9.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v9.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v9.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v7.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v7.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v7.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.3.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-25. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.2.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.1.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-21. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.7.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-21. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.5.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.4.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.4.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.4.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.4.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.3.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-14. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.2.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.19
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.13
3 findingsAccessing /etc/passwd or /etc/shadow — credential harvesting on Linux 9 | test("removes path traversal (strips to basename)", () => { 10 | // The regex strips everything up to and including the last / or \ > 11 | expect(sanitizeFilename("../../etc/passwd")).toBe("passwd"); 12 | }); 13 |
Accessing /etc/passwd or /etc/shadow — credential harvesting on Linux 9 | * @example 10 | * ```typescript > 11 | * sanitizeFilename("../../etc/passwd") // "etc_passwd" 12 | * sanitizeFilename("file<>|name.txt") // "file___name.txt" 13 | * ```
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.12
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.10
3 findingsAccessing /etc/passwd or /etc/shadow — credential harvesting on Linux 9 | test("removes path traversal (strips to basename)", () => { 10 | // The regex strips everything up to and including the last / or \ > 11 | expect(sanitizeFilename("../../etc/passwd")).toBe("passwd"); 12 | }); 13 |
Accessing /etc/passwd or /etc/shadow — credential harvesting on Linux 9 | * @example 10 | * ```typescript > 11 | * sanitizeFilename("../../etc/passwd") // "etc_passwd" 12 | * sanitizeFilename("file<>|name.txt") // "file___name.txt" 13 | * ```
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.9
3 findingsAccessing /etc/passwd or /etc/shadow — credential harvesting on Linux 9 | test("removes path traversal (strips to basename)", () => { 10 | // The regex strips everything up to and including the last / or \ > 11 | expect(sanitizeFilename("../../etc/passwd")).toBe("passwd"); 12 | }); 13 |
Accessing /etc/passwd or /etc/shadow — credential harvesting on Linux 9 | * @example 10 | * ```typescript > 11 | * sanitizeFilename("../../etc/passwd") // "etc_passwd" 12 | * sanitizeFilename("file<>|name.txt") // "file___name.txt" 13 | * ```
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.8
3 findingsAccessing /etc/passwd or /etc/shadow — credential harvesting on Linux 9 | test("removes path traversal (strips to basename)", () => { 10 | // The regex strips everything up to and including the last / or \ > 11 | expect(sanitizeFilename("../../etc/passwd")).toBe("passwd"); 12 | }); 13 |
Accessing /etc/passwd or /etc/shadow — credential harvesting on Linux 9 | * @example 10 | * ```typescript > 11 | * sanitizeFilename("../../etc/passwd") // "etc_passwd" 12 | * sanitizeFilename("file<>|name.txt") // "file___name.txt" 13 | * ```
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.7
3 findingsAccessing /etc/passwd or /etc/shadow — credential harvesting on Linux 9 | test("removes path traversal (strips to basename)", () => { 10 | // The regex strips everything up to and including the last / or \ > 11 | expect(sanitizeFilename("../../etc/passwd")).toBe("passwd"); 12 | }); 13 |
Accessing /etc/passwd or /etc/shadow — credential harvesting on Linux 9 | * @example 10 | * ```typescript > 11 | * sanitizeFilename("../../etc/passwd") // "etc_passwd" 12 | * sanitizeFilename("file<>|name.txt") // "file___name.txt" 13 | * ```
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.6
3 findingsAccessing /etc/passwd or /etc/shadow — credential harvesting on Linux 9 | test("removes path traversal (strips to basename)", () => { 10 | // The regex strips everything up to and including the last / or \ > 11 | expect(sanitizeFilename("../../etc/passwd")).toBe("passwd"); 12 | }); 13 |
Accessing /etc/passwd or /etc/shadow — credential harvesting on Linux 9 | * @example 10 | * ```typescript > 11 | * sanitizeFilename("../../etc/passwd") // "etc_passwd" 12 | * sanitizeFilename("file<>|name.txt") // "file___name.txt" 13 | * ```
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.8.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.