@lodestar/config
Chain configuration required for lodestar
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Lodestar migrated to GitHub Actions CI/CD publishing with SLSA provenance attestation — a supply chain improvement, not a compromise signal. Stable for this package. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): @chainsafe/as-sha256 is from the same ChainSafe org as this package; adding a sibling org's SHA256 utility is expected and low-risk for this project. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@lodestar/utils | AI (dependencies): Same-org Lodestar monorepo package, co-versioned and co-released. Not a security risk. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@lodestar/spec-test-util | AI (dependencies): Same-org Lodestar monorepo package, co-versioned and co-released. Not a security risk. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@chainsafe/ssz | AI (dependencies): First-party ChainSafe ecosystem dependency, co-published as part of the Lodestar monorepo release cycle. Not a security risk. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@lodestar/spec-test-util | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org test utility; phantom-dep flag is a packaging hygiene issue, not a security concern. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@chainsafe/ssz | AI (phantom-deps): Declared in package.json and used transitively; phantom-dep flag is a packaging hygiene issue, not a security concern for this well-established package. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@lodestar/types | AI (dependencies): Same-org Lodestar monorepo package, co-versioned and co-released. Not a security risk. | ai |
Versions (showing 15 of 15)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.43.0 | 6 / 0 | |
| 1.42.0 | 6 / 0 | |
| 1.41.1 | 6 / 0 | |
| 1.41.0 | 6 / 0 | |
| 1.40.0 | 5 / 0 | |
| 1.39.1 | 5 / 0 | |
| 1.39.0 | 5 / 0 | |
| 1.38.0 | 4 / 0 | |
| 1.37.0 | 4 / 0 | |
| 1.36.0 | 4 / 0 | |
| 1.34.1 | 4 / 0 | |
| 1.33.0 | 4 / 0 | |
| 1.32.0 | 4 / 0 | |
| 1.31.0 | 4 / 0 | |
| 1.30.0 | 4 / 0 |
v1.43.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.42.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.41.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.41.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.40.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.39.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-30. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.39.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-28. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.38.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.37.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.36.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.34.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.33.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.32.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.31.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.30.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.