← Home

@lodestar/types

Typescript types required for lodestar

17
Versions
Apache-2.0
License
No
Install Scripts
Verified
Provenance

Supply chain provenance

Status for the latest visible version.

SLSA provenance attestation npm registry signatures gitHead linked

Maintainers

wemeetagainmatthewkeiljoshdougallkalambet

Keywords

ethereumeth-consensusbeaconblockchain

Accepted risks

Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.

SourceRuleReasonAccepted byWhen
provenance publisher-changed AI (provenance): Lodestar migrated to GitHub Actions CI/CD publishing with SLSA provenance attestation. This is a legitimate and security-improving transition for the ChainSafe monorepo. ai
publish-pattern dormant-publish AI (publish-pattern): Package has 2679 versions and 5.5k weekly downloads; dormancy flag is a false positive likely due to publish cadence gaps in a large monorepo, not actual abandonment. ai
dependencies unvetted-dep:@chainsafe/ssz AI (dependencies): @chainsafe/ssz is a first-party ChainSafe dependency used as the SSZ serialization library; its use is expected and appropriate for this Ethereum types package. ai

Versions (showing 17 of 17)

Version Deps Published
1.43.0 3 / 0
1.42.0 3 / 0
1.41.1 3 / 0
1.41.0 3 / 0
1.40.0 3 / 0
1.39.1 3 / 0
1.39.0 3 / 0
1.38.0 3 / 0
1.37.0 3 / 0
1.36.0 3 / 0
1.35.0 3 / 0
1.34.1 3 / 0
1.34.0 3 / 0
1.33.0 3 / 0
1.32.0 3 / 0
1.31.0 3 / 0
1.30.0 3 / 0

v1.43.0

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v1.42.0

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v1.41.1

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v1.41.0

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: wemeetagain → GitHub Actions (on 2026-03-19) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v1.40.0

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: wemeetagain → GitHub Actions (on 2026-02-11) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v1.39.1

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: wemeetagain → GitHub Actions (on 2026-01-30) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-30. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v1.39.0

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: wemeetagain → GitHub Actions (on 2026-01-28) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-28. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v1.38.0

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: wemeetagain → GitHub Actions (on 2025-12-15) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v1.37.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.36.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v1.35.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.34.1

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.34.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.33.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v1.32.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v1.31.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v1.30.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.