@lokalise/backend-http-client
Opinionated HTTP client for the Node.js backend
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): GitHub Actions publish flow with SLSA provenance replaces gitHead; expected after CI migration. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Org migrated publishing to GitHub Actions CI/CD with SLSA attestation; not a takeover signal. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): Removal of human maintainer consistent with org-level shift to automated CI publishing. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:undici-retry | AI (dependencies): undici-retry is a known retry wrapper for undici; expected dep for this HTTP client package. | ai |
Versions (showing 11 of 11)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 11.2.0 | 2 / 11 | |
| 11.1.0 | 2 / 11 | |
| 11.0.0 | 2 / 11 | |
| 10.3.1 | 3 / 11 | |
| 10.3.0 | 3 / 11 | |
| 10.2.0 | 3 / 11 | |
| 10.1.0 | 2 / 11 | |
| 10.0.3 | 2 / 11 | |
| 10.0.2 | 2 / 11 | |
| 10.0.1 | 2 / 11 | |
| 10.0.0 | 2 / 10 |
v11.2.0
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
v11.1.0
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-14. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.0.0
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v10.3.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-04. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v10.3.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v10.2.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v10.1.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v10.0.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-04. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v10.0.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-30. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v10.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v10.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.