@lokalise/non-translatable-markup
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): Expected artifact of CI/CD publish transition, not tampering. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): Org-wide maintainer rotation consistent with Lokalise team, paired with provenance improvement. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): Same rotation event as maintainer-added; benign given provenance context. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Dormancy followed by CI/CD-attested publish, not takeover pattern. | ai |
v3.2.0
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (botlokalise) on 2026-07-13, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v3.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.