@longzai-intelligence/eslint-preset-mcp
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): Internal org tooling package; missing description is cosmetic, not a risk signal here. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): No provenance is common; no other risk signals elevate this. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.2.11 | 1 / 10 | |
| 0.2.6 | 1 / 10 | |
| 0.2.4 | 1 / 10 | |
| 0.1.3 | 1 / 10 | |
| 0.0.2 | 1 / 9 | |
| 0.0.1 | 1 / 9 |
v0.2.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.2.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.