@lovince/core
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:cors | AI (typosquat): Scoped UI component library (@lovince/core); name collision with 'cors' is coincidental, not impersonation. | ai |
v0.0.5
2 findingsPackage name '@lovince/core' is 1 edit(s) away from popular package 'cors'.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.4
2 findingsPackage name '@lovince/core' is 1 edit(s) away from popular package 'cors'.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.3
2 findingsPackage name '@lovince/core' is 1 edit(s) away from popular package 'cors'.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.2
2 findingsPackage name '@lovince/core' is 1 edit(s) away from popular package 'cors'.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.