@lumenflow/initiatives
Initiative tracking for LumenFlow workflow framework - multi-phase project coordination
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:yaml | AI (phantom-deps): yaml is a declared runtime dep with a dedicated ./yaml export; phantom-dep heuristic misfires here. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Private restricted-access monorepo package; provenance attestation not expected for this ecosystem. | ai |
Versions (showing 15 of 15)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 5.8.15 | 3 / 4 | |
| 5.8.14 | 3 / 4 | |
| 5.8.13 | 3 / 4 | |
| 5.8.12 | 3 / 4 | |
| 5.8.11 | 3 / 4 | |
| 5.8.3 | 3 / 4 | |
| 5.3.2 | 3 / 4 | |
| 3.1.1 | 3 / 3 | |
| 2.21.0 | 3 / 3 | |
| 1.3.5 | 3 / 3 | |
| 1.3.4 | 3 / 3 | |
| 1.3.3 | 3 / 3 | |
| 1.3.2 | 3 / 3 | |
| 1.3.0 | 3 / 3 | |
| 1.0.0 | 4 / 2 |
v5.8.15
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.8.14
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.8.13
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.8.12
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.8.11
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.8.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.3.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.1.1
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: hellmai.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.21.0
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: hellmai.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.3.5
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: hellmai.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.3.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.3.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.3.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.3.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.