@lumiastream/artnet-cove
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Scoped internal package in established lumiastream ecosystem; missing metadata is expected for private-use scoped packages. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): Internal scoped package; missing description is consistent across lumiastream packages. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 3.29.2 | 2 / 4 | |
| 3.29.1 | 2 / 4 | |
| 3.28.3 | 2 / 4 | |
| 3.28.1 | 2 / 4 | |
| 3.27.2 | 2 / 4 | |
| 3.21.3 | 2 / 4 |
v3.29.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.29.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.28.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.28.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.27.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.21.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.