@lumino/domutils
Lumino DOM Utilities
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): Established JupyterLab ecosystem package with trusted publisher; missing gitHead reflects a publish environment change, not a security concern for this package. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Lack of Sigstore provenance is a process gap, not a security risk for this well-established package with a highly trusted publisher history. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): jupyterlab-release-bot is the official JupyterLab release automation account; publisher transition from individual maintainer to bot is expected and stable for this package. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): jupyterlab-release-bot is the official JupyterLab release automation account with 3582 approved packages; addition is a legitimate org-level transition. | ai |
Versions (showing 23 of 23)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.0.4 | 0 / 18 | |
| 2.0.3 | 0 / 18 | |
| 2.0.2 | 0 / 18 | |
| 2.0.1 | 0 / 23 | |
| 2.0.0 | 0 / 24 | |
| 1.8.2 | 0 / 22 | |
| 1.8.1 | 0 / 22 | |
| 1.8.0 | 0 / 22 | |
| 1.7.0 | 0 / 22 | |
| 1.6.0 | 0 / 22 | |
| 1.5.2 | 0 / 22 | |
| 1.5.1 | 0 / 22 | |
| 1.5.0 | 0 / 22 | |
| 1.4.0 | 0 / 22 | |
| 1.3.0 | 0 / 22 | |
| 1.2.3 | 0 / 22 | |
| 1.2.2 | 0 / 22 | |
| 1.2.1 | 0 / 23 | |
| 1.2.0 | 0 / 22 | |
| 1.1.7 | 0 / 16 | |
| 1.1.6 | 0 / 16 | |
| 1.1.5 | 0 / 15 | |
| 1.1.4 | 0 / 14 |
v2.0.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.0.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.0.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.0.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2023-07-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.0.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2023-03-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.8.2
3 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: fcollonval.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2022-08-08. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v1.8.1
3 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: jasongrout.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2021-11-04. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v1.8.0
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: blink1073.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.7.0
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: blink1073.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.6.0
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: blink1073.
v1.5.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.5.1
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: blink1073.
v1.5.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.4.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.3.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.2.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.2.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.2.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.2.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.7
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.