@luomus/laji-validate
Declarative validations for JavaScript
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:geojson-bounds | AI (dependencies): Stable dependency present across prior versions; no malware indicators. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@luomus/laji-map | AI (dependencies): Same-org dependency, present across prior versions; no malware indicators. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@luomus/validate | AI (dependencies): Same-org dependency, present across prior versions; no malware indicators. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Org-published package on Bitbucket; provenance attestation not expected for this publisher. | ai |
Versions (showing 10 of 10)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.0.133 | 6 / 18 | |
| 0.0.132 | 6 / 18 | |
| 0.0.131 | 6 / 18 | |
| 0.0.130 | 6 / 18 | |
| 0.0.129 | 6 / 18 | |
| 0.0.127 | 6 / 18 | |
| 0.0.126 | 6 / 18 | |
| 0.0.125 | 6 / 18 | |
| 0.0.124 | 6 / 18 | |
| 0.0.123 | 6 / 18 |
v0.0.133
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (olzraiti) than the most recent previously approved version (merannis) on 2026-05-27, but olzraiti is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.0.132
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.131
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.130
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.129
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.127
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.126
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.125
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.124
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.123
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.