@luxamm/universal-router
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@luxamm/v2-core | AI (phantom-deps): Contract dependencies used via typechain artifacts and config; stable pattern for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@luxamm/v3-core | AI (phantom-deps): Contract dependencies used via typechain artifacts and config; stable pattern for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@openzeppelin/contracts | AI (phantom-deps): Referenced in Solidity contracts and config; not directly imported in JS; stable for contract packages. | ai |
v2.1.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.1.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.