@lynx-js/tasm
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm-metadata | bundled-binaries | AI (npm-metadata): Package is a native N-API addon; bundled .node binary is the expected delivery mechanism. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:dynamic-require | AI (semgrep): Dynamic require is used solely to load the platform-specific prebuilt .node binary — stable pattern for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 10 of 10)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.0.43 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.0.42 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.0.41 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.0.39 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.0.38 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.0.37 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.0.36 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.0.35 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.0.34 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.0.33 | 0 / 3 |
v0.0.43
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.42
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.41
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.39
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.38
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • build/linux/Release/lepus.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.36
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • build/linux/Release/lepus.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.34
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • build/linux/Release/lepus.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.33
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • build/linux/Release/lepus.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.