@lynx-js/tasm
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Sparse metadata typical of early scoped internal package version, not spam. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:lepus.js | AI (source-diff): Emscripten-generated WASM glue code, not obfuscation. | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file:lepus.js | AI (source-diff): Standard Emscripten module loader; not a dropper. | ai | |
| source-diff | source-size-tripled | AI (source-diff): Expected from bundling generated lepus.js runtime. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | bundled-binaries | AI (npm-metadata): Package is a native N-API addon; bundled .node binary is the expected delivery mechanism. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:dynamic-require | AI (semgrep): Dynamic require is used solely to load the platform-specific prebuilt .node binary — stable pattern for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 27 of 27)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.0.48 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.0.47 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.0.46 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.0.45 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.0.44 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.0.43 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.0.42 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.0.41 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.0.39 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.0.38 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.0.37 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.0.36 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.0.35 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.0.34 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.0.33 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.0.30 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.0.29 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.0.28 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.0.27 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.0.26 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.0.25 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.0.24 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.0.23 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.0.22 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.0.21 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.0.20 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.0.1 | 0 / 0 |
v0.0.48
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.47
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.46
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.45
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.30
3 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.29
3 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.28
3 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.27
3 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.26
3 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.25
3 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.24
3 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.23
3 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.22
3 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.21
3 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.20
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.