@lynx-js/web-mainthread-apis
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Move to GitHub Actions publisher with attestation is an org-wide CI migration, not regression. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-takeover | AI (maintainer-change): CI/CD publisher transition with SLSA provenance, not a compromise; org-managed monorepo package. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | bundled-binaries | AI (npm-metadata): wasm binaries are core to this wasm-rendering package, built via documented build script. | ai |
Versions (showing 45 of 45)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.19.9 | 3 / 2 | |
| 0.19.7 | 3 / 2 | |
| 0.19.6 | 3 / 2 | |
| 0.19.5 | 3 / 2 | |
| 0.19.4 | 3 / 2 | |
| 0.19.3 | 3 / 2 | |
| 0.19.2 | 3 / 2 | |
| 0.19.1 | 3 / 2 | |
| 0.19.0 | 3 / 2 | |
| 0.18.4 | 3 / 2 | |
| 0.18.3 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.18.2 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.18.1 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.18.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.17.2 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.17.1 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.17.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.16.1 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.16.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.15.7 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.15.6 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.15.5 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.15.4 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.15.3 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.15.2 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.15.1 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.15.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.14.2 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.14.1 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.14.0 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.13.5 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.13.4 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.13.3 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.13.2 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.13.1 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.13.0 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.12.0 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.11.0 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.10.1 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.10.0 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.9.1 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.9.0 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.8.0 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.7.1 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.7.0 | 4 / 0 |
v0.19.9
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • binary/debug_bg.wasm • binary/legacy_bg.wasm • binary/standard_bg.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.19.7
4 findingsAll previous maintainers (lynxdev-admin, jianliang00) were replaced by new maintainers (colinaaa). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.
Package contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • binary/debug_bg.wasm • binary/legacy_bg.wasm • binary/standard_bg.wasm
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-01. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.19.6
4 findingsAll previous maintainers (lynxdev-admin, jianliang00) were replaced by new maintainers (colinaaa). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.
Package contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • binary/debug_bg.wasm • binary/legacy_bg.wasm • binary/standard_bg.wasm
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-25. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.19.5
4 findingsAll previous maintainers (lynxdev-admin, jianliang00) were replaced by new maintainers (colinaaa). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.
Package contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • binary/debug_bg.wasm • binary/legacy_bg.wasm • binary/standard_bg.wasm
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.19.4
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • binary/debug_bg.wasm • binary/legacy_bg.wasm • binary/standard_bg.wasm
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-04. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.19.3
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • binary/debug_bg.wasm • binary/legacy_bg.wasm • binary/standard_bg.wasm
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-29. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.19.2
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • binary/debug_bg.wasm • binary/legacy_bg.wasm • binary/standard_bg.wasm
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.19.1
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • binary/debug_bg.wasm • binary/legacy_bg.wasm • binary/standard_bg.wasm
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-14. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.19.0
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • binary/debug_bg.wasm • binary/legacy_bg.wasm • binary/standard_bg.wasm
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-07. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.18.4
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • binary/debug_bg.wasm • binary/legacy_bg.wasm • binary/standard_bg.wasm
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-11-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.18.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-11-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.18.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-11-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.18.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-10-25. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.18.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-10-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.17.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-10-01. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.17.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-09-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.17.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-09-21. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.16.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.16.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.15.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.15.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.15.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.15.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.15.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.15.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.15.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.15.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.14.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.14.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.14.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.12.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.11.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.10.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.10.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.9.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.9.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.8.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.7.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.7.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.