@maaxyz/maa-node-linux-arm64
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm-metadata | bundled-binaries | AI (npm-metadata): Native binding package for MaaFramework; bundled .so/.node files are expected and covered by SLSA provenance attestation. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): Platform-specific sub-package of MaaFramework; missing description is cosmetic, not a risk signal. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Signals are structural artifacts of a platform-specific binary sub-package, not spam indicators. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 5.10.4 | 0 / 0 | |
| 5.10.3 | 0 / 0 | |
| 5.10.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 5.10.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 5.10.0 | 0 / 0 |
v5.10.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.10.3
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • libc++.so.1 • libc++abi.so.1 • libonnxruntime.so.1 • libunwind.so.1 • libopencv_world4.so.412 • MaaNode.node • MaaNodeServer.node • libfastdeploy_ppocr.so • libMaaAdbControlUnit.so • libMaaAgentClient.so ... and 9 more
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.10.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.10.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.10.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.