@magiclabs/ui-components
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| install-scripts | install-script:preinstall | AI (install-scripts): Only enforces pnpm as package manager; no arbitrary code execution risk. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.4.0 | 7 / 88 | |
| 2.3.2 | 7 / 88 | |
| 2.3.1 | 7 / 88 | |
| 2.2.3 | 7 / 88 | |
| 2.2.0 | 7 / 88 |
v2.4.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.3.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.3.1
2 findingsScript: npx only-allow pnpm
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.2.3
2 findingsScript: npx only-allow pnpm
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.2.0
2 findingsScript: npx only-allow pnpm
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.