@maioradv/dbs-lib
JS lib for Maior DBS Api
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@maioradv/client-core | AI (dependencies): Same-org scoped package from the same publisher; not an independent third-party risk. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Org-scoped package with no history of provenance; low-risk library with no install scripts. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.0.7 | 2 / 3 | |
| 1.0.6 | 2 / 3 | |
| 1.0.5 | 2 / 3 | |
| 1.0.4 | 1 / 3 | |
| 1.0.3 | 1 / 3 | |
| 1.0.2 | 1 / 3 |
v1.0.7
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.