@mantine/modals
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
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Versions (showing 27 of 27)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 9.5.0 | 0 / 4 | |
| 9.4.2 | 0 / 4 | |
| 9.4.1 | 0 / 4 | |
| 9.4.0 | 0 / 4 | |
| 9.3.2 | 0 / 4 | |
| 9.3.1 | 0 / 4 | |
| 9.3.0 | 0 / 4 | |
| 9.2.2 | 0 / 4 | |
| 9.2.1 | 0 / 4 | |
| 9.2.0 | 0 / 4 | |
| 9.1.1 | 0 / 4 | |
| 9.1.0 | 0 / 4 | |
| 9.0.2 | 0 / 4 | |
| 9.0.1 | 0 / 4 | |
| 9.0.0 | 0 / 4 | |
| 8.3.18 | 0 / 4 | |
| 8.3.17 | 0 / 4 | |
| 8.3.16 | 0 / 4 | |
| 8.3.15 | 0 / 4 | |
| 8.3.14 | 0 / 4 | |
| 8.3.13 | 0 / 4 | |
| 8.3.12 | 0 / 4 | |
| 8.3.11 | 0 / 4 | |
| 8.3.10 | 0 / 4 | |
| 8.3.9 | 0 / 4 | |
| 8.3.8 | 0 / 4 | |
| 8.3.7 | 0 / 4 |
v9.5.0
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (rtivital) on 2026-07-27, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v9.4.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v9.4.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.