@mastra/temporal
Mastra Temporal workflows integration - run Mastra workflows on the Temporal durable execution platform
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions CI publishing with SLSA attestation; consistent with Mastra org's CI/CD practices. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@temporalio/plugin | AI (phantom-deps): Declared as runtime dep for Temporal plugin integration; referenced in config, not directly imported by design. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | suspicious-initial-version | AI (npm-metadata): 0.0.0 is a standard initial monorepo publish pattern for the mastra-ai org; not indicative of malice. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@temporalio/activity | AI (phantom-deps): @temporalio/activity is a declared runtime dep used in config/type context; phantom-dep is a false positive here. | ai |
Versions (showing 14 of 14)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.1.12 | 10 / 11 | |
| 0.1.11 | 10 / 11 | |
| 0.1.10 | 10 / 11 | |
| 0.1.9 | 10 / 11 | |
| 0.1.8 | 10 / 11 | |
| 0.1.7 | 10 / 11 | |
| 0.1.6 | 10 / 11 | |
| 0.1.5 | 10 / 11 | |
| 0.1.4 | 10 / 11 | |
| 0.1.3 | 10 / 11 | |
| 0.1.2 | 10 / 11 | |
| 0.1.1 | 10 / 11 | |
| 0.1.0 | 10 / 11 | |
| 0.0.0 | 9 / 11 |
v0.1.12
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.11
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.10
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.9
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.8
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.5
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-14. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-05. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-04. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.