@mastra/voice-google-gemini-live
Mastra Google Gemini Live API integration
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/_types/@internal_voice/dist/_types/@internal_ai-sdk-v5/dist/index.d.ts | AI (source-diff): Long lines are TypeScript declaration file content (type definitions), not obfuscated/malicious code. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Mastra monorepo migrated to GitHub Actions CI publishing with SLSA attestation; stable for this package going forward. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:zod | AI (phantom-deps): zod is a peer dependency; phantom-dep false positive for peer dep pattern. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@google/genai | AI (phantom-deps): Runtime dep used in build output; phantom-dep heuristic misfires on bundled ESM packages. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:zod-to-json-schema | AI (phantom-deps): Runtime dep likely used in bundled output; stable false positive for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 18 of 18)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.12.0 | 4 / 14 | |
| 0.11.4 | 3 / 14 | |
| 0.11.3 | 5 / 12 | |
| 0.11.2 | 5 / 12 | |
| 0.11.1 | 5 / 10 | |
| 0.11.0 | 5 / 10 | |
| 0.10.18 | 5 / 10 | |
| 0.10.17 | 5 / 10 | |
| 0.10.16 | 5 / 10 | |
| 0.10.15 | 5 / 10 | |
| 0.10.14 | 5 / 10 | |
| 0.10.13 | 5 / 10 | |
| 0.10.12 | 5 / 10 | |
| 0.10.11 | 5 / 9 | |
| 0.10.10 | 5 / 9 | |
| 0.10.9 | 5 / 9 | |
| 0.10.8 | 5 / 9 | |
| 0.10.7 | 5 / 9 |
v0.12.0
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.11.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.11.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.11.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.11.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.10.18
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.10.17
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.10.16
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.10.15
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.10.14
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.10.13
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.10.12
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.10.11
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.10.10
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.10.9
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.10.8
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.10.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.