@material-symbols/svg-500
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
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Versions (showing 31 of 31)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.45.9 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.45.8 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.45.7 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.45.5 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.45.4 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.45.3 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.45.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.45.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.45.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.44.12 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.44.11 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.44.10 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.44.9 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.44.8 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.44.7 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.44.6 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.44.5 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.44.4 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.44.3 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.44.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.44.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.44.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.43.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.42.3 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.40.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.40.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.40.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.39.4 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.39.3 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.39.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.39.1 | 0 / 0 |
v0.45.9
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.45.8
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.45.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.45.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.43.0
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (marella) on 2026-03-27, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.42.3
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (marella) on 2026-03-19, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.40.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.40.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.40.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.39.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.39.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.39.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.39.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.