@mcpc-tech/code-runner-mcp
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions CI publishing with SLSA attestation; legitimate automated publishing pattern. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:json-schema-to-zod | AI (phantom-deps): Referenced in config files but not directly imported; stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@mcpc-tech/ripgrep-napi | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org dep referenced in config; stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:deno | AI (phantom-deps): deno is a declared runtime dependency used via config/CLI, not directly imported in JS source; stable FP for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 15 of 15)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.1.21 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.1.20 | 18 / 0 | |
| 0.1.17 | 18 / 0 | |
| 0.1.16 | 18 / 0 | |
| 0.1.15 | 18 / 0 | |
| 0.1.14 | 17 / 0 | |
| 0.1.13 | 17 / 0 | |
| 0.1.12 | 17 / 0 | |
| 0.1.11 | 17 / 0 | |
| 0.1.10 | 17 / 0 | |
| 0.1.9 | 17 / 0 | |
| 0.1.8 | 17 / 0 | |
| 0.1.7 | 16 / 0 | |
| 0.1.4 | 16 / 0 | |
| 0.1.3 | 15 / 0 |
v0.1.21
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.20
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.17
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.16
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.15
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.14
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-08. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.13
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.12
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.11
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.10
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.9
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.8
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.