@md-oss/observability
Structured logging with Pino
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Package migrated to GitHub Actions CI/CD publishing with SLSA provenance; automation explains the publisher change. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@md-oss/config | AI (phantom-deps): Same org scope (@md-oss); likely used indirectly or as a peer dep within the monorepo. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@md-oss/common | AI (dependencies): Internal monorepo sibling package from same org; expected dependency pattern. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@t3-oss/env-nextjs | AI (dependencies): Well-known t3-oss ecosystem package; stable false positive for this observability lib. | ai |
Versions (showing 21 of 21)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.7.1 | 6 / 5 | |
| 0.6.0 | 6 / 5 | |
| 0.5.0 | 7 / 4 | |
| 0.3.10 | 7 / 4 | |
| 0.3.9 | 7 / 4 | |
| 0.3.8 | 7 / 4 | |
| 0.3.6 | 7 / 4 | |
| 0.3.5 | 7 / 4 | |
| 0.3.4 | 7 / 4 | |
| 0.3.3 | 7 / 4 | |
| 0.3.2 | 7 / 4 | |
| 0.2.4 | 6 / 4 | |
| 0.2.3 | 6 / 4 | |
| 0.2.2 | 6 / 4 | |
| 0.2.1 | 6 / 4 | |
| 0.2.0 | 6 / 4 | |
| 0.1.7 | 4 / 3 | |
| 0.1.6 | 4 / 3 | |
| 0.1.5 | 4 / 3 | |
| 0.1.2 | 4 / 3 | |
| 0.1.0 | 4 / 3 |
v0.7.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.6.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.5.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.10
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.9
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.8
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.6
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.5
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.2.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.5
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.1.2
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.