@mediabunny/ac3
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:ajv | AI (typosquat): Scoped media codec package; name similarity to ajv is coincidental, not a typosquat. | ai |
Versions (showing 45 of 45)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.51.0 | 0 / 1 | |
| 1.50.9 | 0 / 1 | |
| 1.50.8 | 0 / 1 | |
| 1.50.7 | 0 / 1 | |
| 1.50.6 | 0 / 1 | |
| 1.50.5 | 0 / 1 | |
| 1.50.4 | 0 / 1 | |
| 1.50.3 | 0 / 1 | |
| 1.50.2 | 0 / 1 | |
| 1.50.1 | 0 / 1 | |
| 1.50.0 | 0 / 1 | |
| 1.49.0 | 0 / 1 | |
| 1.48.1 | 0 / 1 | |
| 1.48.0 | 0 / 1 | |
| 1.47.0 | 0 / 1 | |
| 1.46.0 | 0 / 1 | |
| 1.45.5 | 0 / 1 | |
| 1.45.4 | 0 / 1 | |
| 1.45.3 | 0 / 1 | |
| 1.45.2 | 0 / 1 | |
| 1.45.1 | 0 / 1 | |
| 1.45.0 | 0 / 1 | |
| 1.44.2 | 0 / 1 | |
| 1.44.1 | 0 / 1 | |
| 1.44.0 | 0 / 1 | |
| 1.43.1 | 0 / 1 | |
| 1.43.0 | 0 / 1 | |
| 1.42.0 | 0 / 1 | |
| 1.41.0 | 0 / 1 | |
| 1.40.1 | 0 / 1 | |
| 1.40.0 | 0 / 1 | |
| 1.39.2 | 0 / 1 | |
| 1.39.1 | 0 / 1 | |
| 1.39.0 | 0 / 1 | |
| 1.38.1 | 0 / 1 | |
| 1.38.0 | 0 / 1 | |
| 1.37.0 | 0 / 1 | |
| 1.36.0 | 0 / 1 | |
| 1.35.1 | 0 / 1 | |
| 1.35.0 | 0 / 1 | |
| 1.34.5 | 0 / 1 | |
| 1.34.4 | 0 / 1 | |
| 1.34.3 | 0 / 1 | |
| 1.34.2 | 0 / 1 | |
| 0.1.0 | 0 / 1 |
v1.51.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.50.9
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.50.8
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.50.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.50.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.50.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.50.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.50.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.50.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.50.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.50.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.40.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.40.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.39.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.39.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.39.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.38.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.38.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.37.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.36.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.35.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.35.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.34.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.34.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.34.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.34.2
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (vanilagy) on 2026-02-12, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.