@medplum/app
Medplum App
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist/assets/index-dIkoxLMl.js | AI (source-diff): Network calls and dynamic patterns are standard React SPA bundle behavior, not dropper malware. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/assets/index-dIkoxLMl.js | AI (source-diff): Vite-minified frontend bundle; expected artifact for @medplum/app across all versions. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/assets/index-C4C5QSCX.js | AI (source-diff): Vite-minified SPA bundle; expected output for this package on every release. | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist/assets/index-C4C5QSCX.js | AI (source-diff): fetch() is the Vite modulepreload polyfill; no dynamic code execution beyond normal SPA routing. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/assets/index-BD57ELip.js | AI (source-diff): Standard Vite minified bundle output; expected for this frontend app package across all versions. | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist/assets/index-BD57ELip.js | AI (source-diff): fetch() in modulepreload polyfill is normal browser app behavior, not dropper malware. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): SLSA provenance attestation confirms legitimate CI/CD publish; dormancy flag is a false positive here. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/assets/index-0vogre2K.js | AI (source-diff): Standard Vite minified SPA bundle with accompanying source map; not obfuscation. | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist/assets/index-0vogre2K.js | AI (source-diff): fetch() in modulepreload polyfill + dynamic module loading is normal Vite SPA bundle behavior. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:hapi | AI (typosquat): Scoped @medplum package; Levenshtein match to 'hapi' is coincidental, not a typosquat. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:ajv | AI (typosquat): Scoped @medplum package; Levenshtein match to 'ajv' is coincidental, not a typosquat. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:yup | AI (typosquat): Scoped @medplum package; Levenshtein match to 'yup' is coincidental, not a typosquat. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:pg | AI (typosquat): Scoped @medplum package; Levenshtein match to 'pg' is coincidental, not a typosquat. | ai |
Versions (showing 7 of 7)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 5.1.13 | 0 / 23 | |
| 5.1.12 | 0 / 23 | |
| 5.1.11 | 0 / 23 | |
| 5.1.10 | 0 / 23 | |
| 5.1.9 | 0 / 23 | |
| 5.1.8 | 0 / 23 | |
| 5.1.7 | 0 / 23 |
v5.1.13
3 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.1.12
3 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.1.11
3 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.1.10
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.1.9
3 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.1.8
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.1.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.