@medusajs/auth-emailpass
Email and password credential authentication provider for Medusa
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source, so a manually published version cannot be tied back to a reviewed commit.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): Legitimate maintainer within Medusa org; benign for this package. | ai | |
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): Large established monorepo package; missing gitHead is a CI config change, not a malware indicator given clean diff and no other risk signals. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Large Medusa monorepo package; provenance not historically enabled for this package family. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Medusa migrated to GitHub Actions CI publishing with SLSA attestation; publisher change is expected and verifiable. | ai |
Versions (showing 51 of 66)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.18.0 | 1 / 1 | |
| 2.17.1 | 1 / 1 | |
| 2.17.0 | 1 / 1 | |
| 2.16.0 | 1 / 1 | |
| 2.15.5 | 1 / 1 | |
| 2.15.3 | 1 / 1 | |
| 2.15.2 | 1 / 1 | |
| 2.15.1 | 1 / 1 | |
| 2.15.0 | 1 / 1 | |
| 2.14.2 | 1 / 1 | |
| 2.14.1 | 1 / 1 | |
| 2.14.0 | 1 / 1 | |
| 2.13.6 | 1 / 1 | |
| 2.13.5 | 1 / 1 | |
| 2.13.4 | 1 / 1 | |
| 2.13.3 | 1 / 1 | |
| 2.13.2 | 1 / 1 | |
| 2.13.1 | 1 / 1 | |
| 2.13.0 | 1 / 1 | |
| 2.12.6 | 1 / 1 | |
| 2.12.5 | 1 / 1 | |
| 2.12.4 | 1 / 1 | |
| 2.12.3 | 1 / 1 | |
| 2.12.2 | 1 / 1 | |
| 2.12.1 | 1 / 1 | |
| 2.12.0 | 1 / 1 | |
| 2.11.3 | 1 / 1 | |
| 2.11.2 | 1 / 6 | |
| 2.11.1 | 1 / 6 | |
| 2.11.0 | 1 / 6 | |
| 2.10.3 | 1 / 6 | |
| 2.10.2 | 1 / 6 | |
| 2.10.1 | 1 / 6 | |
| 2.10.0 | 1 / 6 | |
| 2.9.0 | 1 / 6 | |
| 2.8.8 | 1 / 6 | |
| 2.8.7 | 1 / 6 | |
| 2.8.6 | 1 / 6 | |
| 2.8.5 | 1 / 6 | |
| 2.8.4 | 1 / 6 | |
| 2.8.3 | 1 / 6 | |
| 2.8.2 | 1 / 6 | |
| 2.8.1 | 1 / 6 | |
| 2.8.0 | 1 / 6 | |
| 2.7.1 | 1 / 6 | |
| 2.7.0 | 1 / 6 | |
| 2.6.1 | 1 / 6 | |
| 2.6.0 | 1 / 6 | |
| 2.5.1 | 1 / 6 | |
| 2.5.0 | 1 / 6 | |
| 2.4.0 | 1 / 6 |
v2.18.0
1 findingThis version was published without provenance, but prior versions were published via CI/CD with attestations. This is a strong signal of a potential account compromise or unauthorized publish. Multiple high-profile registry compromises have exhibited exactly this pattern.
v2.7.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.7.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.6.1
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (owjuhl) than the most recent previously approved version (oliverjuhl) on 2025-03-10, but owjuhl is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v2.6.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.5.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.5.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.4.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.