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@medusajs/auth-google

Google OAuth authentication provider for Medusa

65
Versions
MIT
License
No
Install Scripts
Missing
Provenance

Supply chain provenance

Status for the latest visible version.

No SLSA provenance npm registry signatures gitHead linked

Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source, so a manually published version cannot be tied back to a reviewed commit.

Maintainers

sebrindomoliverjuhlnicolas-gorgasradevskiolijuhl

Keywords

medusa-providermedusa-provider-auth-google

Accepted risks

Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.

SourceRuleReasonAccepted byWhen
provenance no-provenance AI (provenance): Medusa org packages consistently lack Sigstore provenance; not a per-version risk signal. ai
provenance missing-githead AI (provenance): Medusa monorepo package; publisher change may reflect org CI rotation, content unchanged from prior version. ai
provenance publisher-changed AI (provenance): medusajs migrated publishing to GitHub Actions CI/CD; SLSA attestation confirms legitimate provenance. ai

Versions (showing 65 of 65)

Version Deps Published
2.18.0 2 / 1
2.17.0 2 / 1
2.16.0 2 / 1
2.15.5 1 / 1
2.15.3 1 / 1
2.15.2 1 / 1
2.15.1 1 / 1
2.15.0 1 / 1
2.14.2 1 / 1
2.14.1 1 / 1
2.14.0 1 / 1
2.13.6 1 / 1
2.13.5 1 / 1
2.13.4 1 / 1
2.13.3 1 / 1
2.13.2 1 / 1
2.13.1 1 / 1
2.13.0 1 / 1
2.12.6 1 / 1
2.12.5 1 / 1
2.12.4 1 / 1
2.12.3 1 / 1
2.12.2 1 / 1
2.12.1 1 / 1
2.12.0 1 / 1
2.11.3 1 / 1
2.11.2 1 / 7
2.11.1 1 / 7
2.11.0 1 / 7
2.10.3 1 / 7
2.10.2 1 / 7
2.10.1 1 / 7
2.10.0 1 / 7
2.9.0 1 / 7
2.8.8 1 / 7
2.8.7 1 / 7
2.8.6 1 / 7
2.8.5 1 / 7
2.8.4 1 / 7
2.8.3 1 / 7
2.8.2 1 / 7
2.8.1 1 / 7
2.8.0 1 / 7
2.7.1 1 / 7
2.7.0 1 / 7
2.6.1 1 / 7
2.6.0 1 / 7
2.5.1 1 / 7
2.5.0 1 / 7
2.4.0 1 / 7
2.3.1 1 / 7
2.3.0 1 / 7
2.2.0 1 / 7
2.1.3 1 / 7
2.1.2 1 / 7
2.1.1 1 / 7
2.1.0 1 / 7
2.0.7 1 / 7
2.0.6 1 / 7
2.0.5 1 / 7
2.0.4 1 / 7
2.0.3 1 / 7
2.0.2 1 / 7
2.0.1 1 / 7
2.0.0 1 / 7

v2.18.0

1 finding
HIGH Provenance attestation missing — previous versions had it provenance

This version was published without provenance, but prior versions were published via CI/CD with attestations. This is a strong signal of a potential account compromise or unauthorized publish. Multiple high-profile registry compromises have exhibited exactly this pattern.

v2.7.1

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v2.7.0

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v2.6.1

2 findings
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

INFO Publisher changed: oliverjuhl → owjuhl (on 2025-03-10, known maintainer) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account (owjuhl) than the most recent previously approved version (oliverjuhl) on 2025-03-10, but owjuhl is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

v2.6.0

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v2.5.1

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v2.5.0

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v2.4.0

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v2.3.1

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v2.3.0

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v2.2.0

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v2.1.3

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v2.1.2

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v2.1.1

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v2.1.0

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v2.0.7

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v2.0.6

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v2.0.5

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v2.0.4

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v2.0.3

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v2.0.2

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v2.0.1

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v2.0.0

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.