@medusajs/medusa
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source, so a manually published version cannot be tied back to a reviewed commit.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | large-new-source-files | AI (source-diff): Normal monorepo build output churn for this package. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): owjuhl removed because account was renamed to olijuhl. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): olijuhl is the renamed owjuhl account within medusajs org. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): owjuhl→olijuhl is an account rename within the medusajs org; stable for this package. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established high-download package; lack of provenance is consistent across all versions and not a risk signal here. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:jsonwebtoken | AI (phantom-deps): Declared runtime dep; used in auth flows indirectly. Stable false positive. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@medusajs/telemetry | AI (dependencies): Same-org monorepo dep at matching version; stable pattern for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:fs-exists-cached | AI (phantom-deps): Listed in dependencies; config-file reference pattern, stable false positive. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:compression | AI (phantom-deps): Listed in dependencies; config-file reference pattern, stable false positive. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@medusajs/draft-order | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org dep; phantom-dep heuristic false positive for monorepo config-file references. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@medusajs/admin-bundler | AI (dependencies): Same-org monorepo dep at matching version; stable pattern for this package. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@medusajs/draft-order | AI (dependencies): Same-org monorepo dep at matching version; stable pattern for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 65 of 65)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.18.0 | 68 / 1 | |
| 2.17.0 | 68 / 1 | |
| 2.16.0 | 68 / 1 | |
| 2.15.5 | 68 / 1 | |
| 2.15.3 | 68 / 1 | |
| 2.15.2 | 68 / 1 | |
| 2.15.1 | 68 / 1 | |
| 2.15.0 | 68 / 1 | |
| 2.14.2 | 68 / 1 | |
| 2.14.1 | 68 / 1 | |
| 2.14.0 | 68 / 1 | |
| 2.13.6 | 67 / 1 | |
| 2.13.5 | 67 / 1 | |
| 2.13.4 | 67 / 1 | |
| 2.13.3 | 67 / 1 | |
| 2.13.2 | 67 / 1 | |
| 2.13.1 | 66 / 1 | |
| 2.13.0 | 66 / 1 | |
| 2.12.6 | 66 / 1 | |
| 2.12.5 | 67 / 1 | |
| 2.12.4 | 67 / 1 | |
| 2.12.3 | 67 / 1 | |
| 2.12.2 | 67 / 1 | |
| 2.12.1 | 66 / 1 | |
| 2.12.0 | 66 / 1 | |
| 2.11.3 | 66 / 1 | |
| 2.11.2 | 68 / 17 | |
| 2.11.1 | 68 / 17 | |
| 2.11.0 | 68 / 17 | |
| 2.10.3 | 66 / 17 | |
| 2.10.2 | 66 / 17 | |
| 2.10.1 | 66 / 17 | |
| 2.10.0 | 66 / 17 | |
| 2.9.0 | 64 / 17 | |
| 2.8.8 | 64 / 17 | |
| 2.8.7 | 64 / 17 | |
| 2.8.6 | 64 / 17 | |
| 2.8.5 | 64 / 17 | |
| 2.8.4 | 64 / 17 | |
| 2.8.3 | 64 / 17 | |
| 2.8.2 | 61 / 17 | |
| 2.8.1 | 61 / 17 | |
| 2.8.0 | 61 / 17 | |
| 2.7.1 | 60 / 19 | |
| 2.7.0 | 60 / 19 | |
| 2.6.1 | 60 / 19 | |
| 2.6.0 | 60 / 18 | |
| 2.5.1 | 60 / 18 | |
| 2.5.0 | 63 / 16 | |
| 2.4.0 | 63 / 16 | |
| 2.3.1 | 63 / 16 | |
| 2.3.0 | 63 / 16 | |
| 2.2.0 | 63 / 15 | |
| 2.1.3 | 63 / 15 | |
| 2.1.2 | 63 / 15 | |
| 2.1.1 | 63 / 15 | |
| 2.1.0 | 63 / 15 | |
| 2.0.7 | 63 / 15 | |
| 2.0.6 | 63 / 15 | |
| 2.0.5 | 63 / 15 | |
| 2.0.4 | 63 / 15 | |
| 2.0.3 | 63 / 15 | |
| 2.0.2 | 63 / 15 | |
| 2.0.1 | 63 / 15 | |
| 2.0.0 | 63 / 15 |
v2.18.0
2 findingsThis version was published without provenance, but prior versions were published via CI/CD with attestations. This is a strong signal of a potential account compromise or unauthorized publish. Multiple high-profile registry compromises have exhibited exactly this pattern.
This version was published by a different npm account (olijuhl) than the most recent previously approved version (GitHub Actions) on 2026-07-23, but olijuhl is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v2.7.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.7.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.6.1
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (owjuhl) than the most recent previously approved version (oliverjuhl) on 2025-03-10, but owjuhl is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v2.6.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.5.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.5.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.4.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.3.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.3.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.2.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.1.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.1.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.1.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.7
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.