@medusajs/types
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source, so a manually published version cannot be tied back to a reviewed commit.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Large established Medusa monorepo package; provenance attestation not historically present. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions CI publisher is confirmed by SLSA provenance attestation; expected for medusajs monorepo releases. | ai |
Versions (showing 51 of 65)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.18.0 | 1 / 1 | |
| 2.17.0 | 1 / 1 | |
| 2.16.0 | 1 / 1 | |
| 2.15.5 | 1 / 1 | |
| 2.15.3 | 1 / 1 | |
| 2.15.2 | 1 / 1 | |
| 2.15.1 | 1 / 1 | |
| 2.15.0 | 1 / 1 | |
| 2.14.2 | 1 / 1 | |
| 2.14.1 | 1 / 1 | |
| 2.14.0 | 1 / 1 | |
| 2.13.6 | 1 / 1 | |
| 2.13.5 | 1 / 1 | |
| 2.13.4 | 1 / 1 | |
| 2.13.3 | 1 / 1 | |
| 2.13.2 | 1 / 1 | |
| 2.13.1 | 1 / 1 | |
| 2.13.0 | 1 / 1 | |
| 2.12.6 | 1 / 1 | |
| 2.12.5 | 1 / 1 | |
| 2.12.4 | 1 / 1 | |
| 2.12.3 | 1 / 1 | |
| 2.12.2 | 1 / 1 | |
| 2.12.1 | 1 / 1 | |
| 2.12.0 | 1 / 1 | |
| 2.11.3 | 1 / 1 | |
| 2.11.2 | 1 / 7 | |
| 2.11.1 | 1 / 7 | |
| 2.11.0 | 1 / 7 | |
| 2.10.3 | 1 / 7 | |
| 2.10.2 | 1 / 7 | |
| 2.10.1 | 1 / 7 | |
| 2.10.0 | 1 / 7 | |
| 2.9.0 | 1 / 7 | |
| 2.8.8 | 1 / 7 | |
| 2.8.7 | 1 / 7 | |
| 2.8.6 | 1 / 7 | |
| 2.8.5 | 1 / 7 | |
| 2.8.4 | 1 / 6 | |
| 2.8.3 | 1 / 6 | |
| 2.8.2 | 1 / 6 | |
| 2.8.1 | 1 / 6 | |
| 2.8.0 | 1 / 6 | |
| 2.7.1 | 1 / 6 | |
| 2.7.0 | 1 / 6 | |
| 2.6.1 | 1 / 6 | |
| 2.6.0 | 1 / 6 | |
| 2.5.1 | 1 / 6 | |
| 2.5.0 | 1 / 6 | |
| 2.4.0 | 1 / 6 | |
| 2.3.1 | 1 / 6 |
v2.18.0
1 findingThis version was published without provenance, but prior versions were published via CI/CD with attestations. This is a strong signal of a potential account compromise or unauthorized publish. Multiple high-profile registry compromises have exhibited exactly this pattern.
v2.7.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.7.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.6.1
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (owjuhl) than the most recent previously approved version (oliverjuhl) on 2025-03-10, but owjuhl is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v2.6.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.5.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.5.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.4.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.3.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.