@mekari/pixel-airene-button
Mekari Pixel | Airene button component
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Mekari org packages consistently lack Sigstore provenance; stable false positive for this publisher. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.1.11 | 5 / 2 | |
| 0.1.10 | 5 / 2 | |
| 0.1.9 | 5 / 2 | |
| 0.1.8 | 5 / 2 | |
| 0.1.7 | 5 / 2 |
v0.1.11
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.10
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.9
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.8
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.7
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.