@mekari/pixel-banner
Mekari Pixel | Breaks the main user flow to present information component
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Mekari org consistently publishes without Sigstore provenance; stable pattern across all versions. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.4.35 | 5 / 2 | |
| 0.4.34 | 5 / 2 | |
| 0.4.33 | 5 / 2 | |
| 0.4.32 | 5 / 2 | |
| 0.4.31 | 5 / 2 |
v0.4.35
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.4.34
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.4.33
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.4.32
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.4.31
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.