@mekari/pixel-input
Mekari Pixel | Input component
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@mekari/pixel-box | AI (dependencies): Internal sibling package from same Mekari org; expected dependency pattern for this component library. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@mekari/pixel-utils | AI (dependencies): Internal sibling package from same Mekari org; expected dependency pattern for this component library. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established org package; no provenance is consistent across all 70 versions and is not a security signal here. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.5.37 | 3 / 2 | |
| 0.5.36 | 3 / 2 | |
| 0.5.35 | 3 / 2 | |
| 0.5.34 | 3 / 2 | |
| 0.5.33 | 3 / 2 |
v0.5.37
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.5.36
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.5.35
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.5.34
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.5.33
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.