@memberjunction/ai-bridge-teams
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Manual-to-CI/CD provenance improvement, not a compromise indicator. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): Same-org MemberJunction deps consistent with monorepo structure. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@memberjunction/core-entities | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org sibling package, heuristic false positive. | ai |
Versions (showing 11 of 11)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 5.49.0 | 4 / 4 | |
| 5.48.0 | 4 / 4 | |
| 5.47.0 | 4 / 4 | |
| 5.46.0 | 4 / 4 | |
| 5.45.1 | 4 / 4 | |
| 5.45.0 | 4 / 4 | |
| 5.44.0 | 4 / 4 | |
| 5.43.0 | 4 / 4 | |
| 5.42.0 | 4 / 4 | |
| 5.41.0 | 4 / 4 | |
| 0.0.1 | 0 / 0 |
v5.49.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.48.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.47.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.46.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.45.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.45.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.44.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-07-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.43.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-06-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.42.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-06-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.41.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-06-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.