@memberjunction/ai-knowledge-pipeline ISC 22 versions

@memberjunction/ai-knowledge-pipeline

npm Repository Homepage

MemberJunction: Knowledge Pipeline - unified ingest/autotag/vectorize orchestrator

22

Versions

ISC

License

No

Install Scripts

Verified

Provenance

Supply chain provenance

Status for the latest visible version.

SLSA provenance attestation npm registry signatures gitHead linked

Maintainers

craig.adam.bcethan-bcjordanfanapourcaeleb.balanesiianzygmuntanag123hiltongrjosue-garcia-bcrkihm-bc

Accepted risks

Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.

Source	Rule	Reason	Accepted by	When
provenance	publisher-changed	AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions CI publisher with SLSA attestation; consistent with org-wide CI/CD adoption.	ai	2026/05/01
phantom-deps	phantom-dep:@memberjunction/ai	AI (phantom-deps): Same-org dep; likely re-exported transitively, stable false positive for this package.	ai	2026/05/01
phantom-deps	phantom-dep:@memberjunction/global	AI (phantom-deps): Same-org dep; likely re-exported transitively, stable false positive for this package.	ai	2026/05/01
phantom-deps	phantom-dep:@memberjunction/aiengine	AI (phantom-deps): Same-org dep; likely re-exported transitively, stable false positive for this package.	ai	2026/05/01
phantom-deps	phantom-dep:@memberjunction/ai-vectors	AI (phantom-deps): Same-org dep; likely re-exported transitively, stable false positive for this package.	ai	2026/05/01
phantom-deps	phantom-dep:@memberjunction/ai-vectordb	AI (phantom-deps): Same-org dep; likely re-exported transitively, stable false positive for this package.	ai	2026/05/01
phantom-deps	phantom-dep:@memberjunction/core-entities	AI (phantom-deps): Same-org dep; likely re-exported transitively, stable false positive for this package.	ai	2026/05/01

Versions (showing 22 of 22)

Version	Deps	Published
5.39.0	8 / 2	2026-06-05
5.38.0	8 / 2	2026-05-30
5.37.0	8 / 2	2026-05-24
5.36.0	8 / 2	2026-05-22
5.35.0	8 / 2	2026-05-21
5.34.1	8 / 2	2026-05-14
5.34.0	8 / 2	2026-05-14
5.33.0	8 / 2	2026-05-08
5.32.0	8 / 2	2026-05-04
5.31.0	8 / 2	2026-05-03
5.30.1	8 / 2	2026-04-27
5.30.0	8 / 2	2026-04-27
5.29.0	8 / 2	2026-04-22
5.28.0	8 / 2	2026-04-20
5.27.1	8 / 2	2026-04-19
5.27.0	8 / 2	2026-04-18
5.26.0	8 / 2	2026-04-13
5.25.0	8 / 2	2026-04-13
5.24.0	8 / 2	2026-04-07
5.23.0	8 / 2	2026-04-04
5.22.0	8 / 2	2026-04-02
0.0.1	0 / 0	2026-04-02

v5.39.0

1 finding

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v5.38.0

1 finding

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v5.37.0

1 finding

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v5.36.0

1 finding

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v5.35.0

1 finding

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v5.34.1

1 finding

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v5.34.0

1 finding

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v5.33.0

1 finding

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v5.32.0

1 finding

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v5.31.0

1 finding

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v5.30.1

1 finding

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v5.30.0

2 findings

HIGH Publisher changed: caeleb.balanesi → GitHub Actions (on 2026-04-27) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v5.29.0

2 findings

HIGH Publisher changed: caeleb.balanesi → GitHub Actions (on 2026-04-22) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v5.28.0

2 findings

HIGH Publisher changed: caeleb.balanesi → GitHub Actions (on 2026-04-20) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v5.27.1

2 findings

HIGH Publisher changed: caeleb.balanesi → GitHub Actions (on 2026-04-19) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v5.27.0

2 findings

HIGH Publisher changed: caeleb.balanesi → GitHub Actions (on 2026-04-18) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v5.26.0

2 findings

HIGH Publisher changed: caeleb.balanesi → GitHub Actions (on 2026-04-13) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v5.25.0

2 findings

HIGH Publisher changed: caeleb.balanesi → GitHub Actions (on 2026-04-13) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v5.24.0

2 findings

HIGH Publisher changed: caeleb.balanesi → GitHub Actions (on 2026-04-07) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-07. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v5.23.0

2 findings

HIGH Publisher changed: caeleb.balanesi → GitHub Actions (on 2026-04-04) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-04. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v5.22.0

2 findings

HIGH Publisher changed: caeleb.balanesi → GitHub Actions (on 2026-04-02) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.0.1

1 finding

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.