@memberjunction/ng-actions
MemberJunction Action Runner - Reusable components for testing and running actions with no Kendo dependencies
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/lib/action-param-dialog/action-param-dialog.component.js | AI (source-diff): Angular ngc compiler output; long lines are template function artifacts, not obfuscation. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/lib/action-test-harness/action-test-harness.component.js | AI (source-diff): Angular ngc compiler output; long lines are template function artifacts, not obfuscation. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/lib/action-test-harness-dialog/action-test-harness-dialog.component.js | AI (source-diff): Angular ngc compiler output; long lines are template function artifacts, not obfuscation. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/lib/action-result-code-dialog/action-result-code-dialog.component.js | AI (source-diff): Angular ngc compiler output; long lines are template function artifacts, not obfuscation. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions CI publisher is confirmed by SLSA provenance attestation; consistent with org-wide CI/CD adoption. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:rxjs | AI (phantom-deps): rxjs is a peer/framework dep referenced in Angular config; not directly imported by convention. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@memberjunction/graphql-dataprovider | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org scoped package; indirect usage expected in MemberJunction monorepo. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@angular/platform-browser | AI (phantom-deps): Framework-scoped Angular package loaded by convention, not direct import. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@memberjunction/global | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org scoped package; indirect usage is expected in MemberJunction monorepo. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:tslib | AI (phantom-deps): tslib is a known implicit TypeScript runtime dependency. | ai |
Versions (showing 51 of 54)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 5.39.0 | 8 / 3 | |
| 5.38.0 | 8 / 3 | |
| 5.37.0 | 8 / 3 | |
| 5.36.0 | 8 / 3 | |
| 5.35.0 | 8 / 3 | |
| 5.34.1 | 8 / 3 | |
| 5.34.0 | 8 / 3 | |
| 5.33.0 | 8 / 3 | |
| 5.32.0 | 8 / 3 | |
| 5.31.0 | 8 / 3 | |
| 5.30.1 | 7 / 3 | |
| 5.30.0 | 7 / 3 | |
| 5.29.0 | 7 / 3 | |
| 5.28.0 | 7 / 3 | |
| 5.27.1 | 7 / 3 | |
| 5.27.0 | 7 / 3 | |
| 5.26.0 | 7 / 3 | |
| 5.25.0 | 7 / 3 | |
| 5.24.0 | 7 / 3 | |
| 5.23.0 | 7 / 3 | |
| 5.22.0 | 7 / 3 | |
| 5.21.0 | 7 / 3 | |
| 5.20.0 | 7 / 3 | |
| 5.19.0 | 7 / 3 | |
| 5.18.0 | 7 / 3 | |
| 5.17.0 | 7 / 3 | |
| 5.16.0 | 7 / 3 | |
| 5.15.0 | 7 / 3 | |
| 5.14.0 | 7 / 3 | |
| 5.13.0 | 7 / 3 | |
| 5.12.0 | 7 / 3 | |
| 5.11.0 | 7 / 3 | |
| 5.10.1 | 7 / 3 | |
| 5.10.0 | 7 / 3 | |
| 5.9.0 | 7 / 3 | |
| 5.8.0 | 7 / 3 | |
| 5.7.0 | 7 / 3 | |
| 5.6.0 | 7 / 3 | |
| 5.5.0 | 7 / 3 | |
| 5.4.1 | 7 / 3 | |
| 5.4.0 | 7 / 3 | |
| 5.3.1 | 7 / 3 | |
| 5.3.0 | 7 / 3 | |
| 5.2.0 | 7 / 3 | |
| 5.1.0 | 7 / 3 | |
| 5.0.0 | 7 / 3 | |
| 4.4.0 | 7 / 3 | |
| 4.3.1 | 7 / 3 | |
| 4.3.0 | 7 / 3 | |
| 4.2.0 | 7 / 2 | |
| 4.1.0 | 7 / 2 |
v5.39.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.38.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.37.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.36.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.35.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.34.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.34.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.33.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.32.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.31.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.30.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.29.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.28.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.27.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.27.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.26.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.25.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.24.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.23.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.22.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.21.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.20.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.19.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.18.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.17.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-24. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.16.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-24. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.15.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.14.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.13.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-17. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.12.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.11.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.10.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.10.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.9.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-08. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.8.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.7.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-04. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.6.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.5.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.4.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.4.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.3.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-24. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.3.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-24. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.2.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.1.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.4.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.3.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.3.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.2.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.1.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.