@memberjunction/ng-kanban
MemberJunction: Generic Kanban board component with drag-and-drop column management
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/lib/components/kanban-board.component.js | AI (source-diff): Angular compiler output (ɵɵ* APIs); long lines are normal for compiled Angular templates, not obfuscation. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions CI publisher with SLSA provenance is a legitimate supply chain improvement for this monorepo. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:tslib | AI (phantom-deps): tslib is a known Angular/TypeScript runtime implicit dependency; stable false positive for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 21 of 21)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 5.39.0 | 4 / 3 | |
| 5.38.0 | 4 / 3 | |
| 5.37.0 | 4 / 3 | |
| 5.36.0 | 4 / 3 | |
| 5.35.0 | 4 / 3 | |
| 5.34.1 | 4 / 3 | |
| 5.34.0 | 4 / 3 | |
| 5.33.0 | 4 / 3 | |
| 5.32.0 | 4 / 3 | |
| 5.31.0 | 4 / 3 | |
| 5.30.1 | 4 / 3 | |
| 5.30.0 | 4 / 3 | |
| 5.29.0 | 4 / 3 | |
| 5.28.0 | 4 / 3 | |
| 5.27.1 | 4 / 3 | |
| 5.27.0 | 4 / 3 | |
| 5.26.0 | 4 / 3 | |
| 5.25.0 | 4 / 3 | |
| 5.24.0 | 4 / 3 | |
| 5.23.0 | 4 / 3 | |
| 0.0.1 | 0 / 0 |
v5.39.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.38.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.37.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.36.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.35.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.34.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.34.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.33.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.32.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.31.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.30.0
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.29.0
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.28.0
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.27.1
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.27.0
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.26.0
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.25.0
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.24.0
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-07. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.23.0
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-04. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.