@memberjunction/record-comparison
OIDC trusted publishing setup package for @memberjunction/record-comparison
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition from manual publish to GitHub Actions CI/CD with SLSA attestation; provenance direction is IMPROVED. | ai |
Versions (showing 8 of 8)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 5.49.0 | 3 / 2 | |
| 5.48.0 | 3 / 2 | |
| 5.47.0 | 3 / 2 | |
| 5.46.0 | 3 / 2 | |
| 5.45.1 | 3 / 2 | |
| 5.45.0 | 3 / 2 | |
| 5.44.0 | 3 / 2 | |
| 0.0.1 | 0 / 0 |
v5.49.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.48.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.47.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.46.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.45.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.45.0
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-07-07. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v5.44.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on unknown date. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.