@mercuryo-ai/magicbrowse-cli
CLI for @mercuryo-ai/magicbrowse
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): GitHub Actions publisher; provenance absence is common and no other risk signals present. | ai |
Versions (showing 7 of 7)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.0.9 | 5 / 3 | |
| 0.0.8 | 4 / 3 | |
| 0.0.7 | 4 / 3 | |
| 0.0.6 | 4 / 3 | |
| 0.0.3 | 4 / 3 | |
| 0.0.2 | 4 / 3 | |
| 0.0.1 | 4 / 3 |
v0.0.9
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.8
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.7
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.