@meru2802/nexus-modscript-composer
Compose multi-layer deployment scripts for NexusEPM agents (L0 → L1 → L2 pipeline)
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:shellcheck | AI (dependencies): shellcheck is a well-known shell linting tool; expected dependency for a deployment script composer package. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Absence of provenance is common (~88% of npm packages); no other risk signals elevate this. | ai |
Versions (showing 14 of 14)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.0.10 | 0 / 5 | |
| 2.0.9 | 0 / 5 | |
| 2.0.8 | 0 / 5 | |
| 2.0.7 | 0 / 5 | |
| 2.0.6 | 0 / 5 | |
| 2.0.5 | 0 / 5 | |
| 2.0.4 | 0 / 5 | |
| 2.0.3 | 0 / 5 | |
| 2.0.2 | 0 / 5 | |
| 2.0.1 | 0 / 5 | |
| 2.0.0 | 0 / 5 | |
| 1.2.0 | 0 / 5 | |
| 1.1.0 | 1 / 5 | |
| 1.0.0 | 1 / 3 |
v2.0.10
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.9
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.8
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.7
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.2.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.