@mescius/wijmo.grid
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@mescius/wijmo | AI (dependencies): First-party MESCIUS dependency pinned to same version; stable pattern across all wijmo packages. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@mescius/wijmo.input | AI (dependencies): First-party MESCIUS dependency pinned to same version; stable pattern across all wijmo packages. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 5.20261.50 | 2 / 0 | |
| 5.20261.48 | 2 / 0 | |
| 5.20252.44 | 2 / 0 | |
| 5.20252.42 | 2 / 0 | |
| 5.20251.40 | 2 / 0 |
v5.20261.50
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.20261.48
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.20252.44
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.20252.42
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.20251.40
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.