@metamask/authenticated-user-storage
SDK for authenticated (non-encrypted) user storage endpoints
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition from metamaskbot to GitHub Actions CI/CD with SLSA provenance; expected for MetaMask/core monorepo. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): Added maintainers are known MetaMask org members; stable for this package. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): MetaMask/core monorepo packages consistently lack Sigstore provenance; stable false positive for this publisher. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 3.0.1 | 5 / 11 | |
| 3.0.0 | 5 / 11 | |
| 2.1.0 | 5 / 11 | |
| 2.0.0 | 5 / 11 | |
| 1.0.1 | 5 / 11 | |
| 1.0.0 | 5 / 11 |
v3.0.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-07-01. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.1.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-06-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.