@metamask/institutional-wallet-snap
Institutional accounts in MetaMask.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | encoded-string-file:dist/bundle.js | AI (source-diff): Long strings are minified crypto/hashing code in a MetaMask snap bundle; stable false positive for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 4 of 4)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.5.0 | 0 / 41 | |
| 1.3.4 | 0 / 41 | |
| 1.3.3 | 0 / 41 | |
| 1.3.2 | 0 / 41 |
v1.5.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.3.4
2 findingsModified file contains 9 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.3.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.3.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.