@metamask/keyring-sdk
10
Versions
—
License
No
Install Scripts
Verified
Provenance
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
SLSA provenance attestation
npm registry signatures
gitHead linked
Maintainers
kumavisfrederikboldingmetamaskbotgudahttmrtenmcmirenaugtur
Keywords
keyringmetamask
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): MetaMask packages consistently publish without Sigstore provenance; stable false positive for this org. | ai |
Versions (showing 10 of 10)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.3.0 | 10 / 17 | |
| 2.2.0 | 10 / 17 | |
| 2.1.1 | 10 / 17 | |
| 2.1.0 | 10 / 17 | |
| 2.0.2 | 10 / 17 | |
| 2.0.1 | 10 / 17 | |
| 2.0.0 | 10 / 17 | |
| 1.2.0 | 10 / 17 | |
| 1.1.0 | 9 / 17 | |
| 1.0.0 | 8 / 17 |
v2.3.0
2 findings
INFO
Has SLSA provenance attestation
provenance
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
INFO
Publisher changed: metamaskbot → GitHub Actions (on unknown date, now via trusted publisher with provenance)
provenance
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (metamaskbot) on unknown date, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.