@metamask/keyring-utils
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established MetaMask package; lack of provenance is consistent across their published versions. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 4.0.0 | 4 / 16 | |
| 3.3.1 | 4 / 16 | |
| 3.3.0 | 4 / 16 | |
| 3.2.0 | 4 / 16 | |
| 3.1.0 | 4 / 16 | |
| 3.0.0 | 4 / 16 |
v4.0.0
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (metamaskbot) on unknown date, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v3.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.